Where MEDINA stands today.

Full transparency on what we've built, what we're working on, and where we're going.

What we've built.

Engine

Matryoshka Chains (sequential AES-256-CBC)
Blind Souk Routing (SHA3-256 hash maze)
Combined MEDINA format with header
Challenge generator
Performance benchmarking
Encrypt/decrypt roundtrip verified

Challenges

Challenge #1: 8 layers, 16-bit path (crackable)
Forever File: 64 layers, 256-bit path (impossible)
Verification scripts (SHA-256 hash check)
Open challenge to quantum industry

Website

Main landing page (bright, transparent design)
Challenge #1 page with live clock
Forever File page with physics explanation
Trilingual support (EN / FR / ZH)
Auto language detection
This status page

Documentation

Full algorithm specification (CONCEPT.md)
MOAL v1.0 License
README with usage examples
Honest assessment of limitations

Audit

Internal code audit completed
Overstated claims identified and corrected
Oracle issue in Blind Souk documented
Dead code identified (mat_size in header)

What we're working on right now.

MEDINA V2 — Implementation Hardening

Entropy validation (reject weak randomness)
Key reuse detection and prevention
Constant-time operations (side-channel resistance)
IV uniqueness guarantees
Secure key erasure from memory
Input validation and error handling

Outreach

Quantum industry challenge campaign
GitHub repository preparation
Academic paper draft

MEDINA V2: The Real Threats

"Unbreakable" designs don't fail because of brute force — they fail because of human mistakes. V2 addresses every implementation-level vulnerability that matters in real-world cryptography.

Weak Randomness

If the random number generator isn't truly 256-bit entropy, the entire security model collapses. V2 validates entropy sources, rejects insufficient randomness, and supports hardware RNG.

In Progress

Key Reuse / Leakage

Reusing a key with different data leaks information. V2 enforces single-use keys, tracks key usage, and warns on reuse attempts.

In Progress

Side-Channel Attacks

Timing attacks, power analysis, cache-based attacks can extract keys without breaking the math. V2 implements constant-time comparisons and operations throughout.

In Progress

AES Mode / IV Safety

IV reuse in CBC mode is catastrophic. V2 guarantees unique IVs per operation, validates IV length, and adds integrity checking.

In Progress

Key Storage

Keys in memory, swap files, or core dumps are recoverable. V2 implements secure memory erasure, mlock'd buffers, and key derivation-on-demand.

In Progress

Code Bugs

Buffer overflows, integer overflows, off-by-one errors. V2 adds comprehensive input validation, size checks, and fuzzing-ready test harness.

In Progress

Where MEDINA is going.

Near Term

V2 hardened engine release
Rust reference implementation
Formal security proofs
Third-party security audit

Medium Term

Integration libraries (Python, Rust, C, JS)
TLS/SSH plugin architecture
Enterprise licensing program
Academic paper publication

Long Term

IETF RFC submission
NIST evaluation track
Hardware acceleration (FPGA/ASIC)
Potential open-source release